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PREVENTING MORE MASS VIOLENCE IN RWANDA 
On May 12, 1995 a group of Americans drawn from government, private humanitarian 
agencies, and including regional experts, met in Washington to consider the obstacles, 
opportunities, and options for preventing more mass violence in Rwanda. 
Discussion focused initially on the role and mission of the 5500 peacekeepers that 
comprise the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) as its mandate expires on 
June 9, 1995. Decisions regarding whether and on what terms to renew UNAMIR will 
have a vital impact on the immediate security of the Rwandan people, and on the 
prospects for national reconciliation and stability. Participants also noted that the UN 
Security Council should view this opportunity to redesign and renew UNAMIR as an 
essential gateway to long-term regional security and economic cooperation in central 
Africa. 
A second theme to emerge emphasized-the central role that France and the United 
States must play jointly if we are to avoid another disaster and have peace prevail in 
Rwanda. Renewal of UNAMlR offers the first opportunity for the Clinton Administration 
to engage the new Chirac government in a fresh attempt to resolve deep differences in 
their Africa policies that have been largely overlooked and allowed to Worsen in recent 
years. Paris and Washington should give Rwanda a higher priority on their bi-lateral 
political agenda because of the immediate danger of mass violence, the risk that 
recriminations over further failures in Rwanda might spark sharper disagreements over 
the US "Horn of Africa Initiative" or French pursuit of their interests in West Africa, 
which could eventually lead to an erosion mutual confidence in the handling of 
important non-African issues. Progress on Rwanda could spur joint efforts at conflict 
prevention and resolution on other African crises and even fuel their global partnership. 
Whv Extend UNAMIR? 
• A continued UNIMIR presence is vital to protect and strengthen the position of 
endangered moderates in the Tutsi and Hutu communities, particularly in the 
aftermath of the killings three weeks ago of Hutus by government forces 
attempting to close the Kibeho refugee camp. 
• There is an urgent and widespread need for UN peace and human rights 
monitors throughout the country. The original UNAM!R mandate, to provide 
security for humanitarian operations, must be redrawn now that the camps for 
the internally displaced have been closed. A reconstituted mandate may permit 
UNAMIR to reduce its personnel tor between 2500 and 3000. 
• An effective UN presence in Rwanda will help reduce the risk that further 
outbreaks of mass violence will slow the return of refugees, precipitate additional 
refugees, or undermine fragile political stability in neighboring countries. 
· • UN human rights monitors, representatives of other UN specialized agencies, 
international and bi-lateral aid donors, and some 120 Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) that are providing human rights, relief, and technical 
assistance throughout Rwanda need UNAMIR. 
Factors Hampering the Renewal of UNAMIR 
• The Rwanda (RPF) government has become increasingly skeptical of UN peace 
operations and other external involvement, in part because foreign governments 
and international organizations failed to deliver on· promises of assistance, but 
also because it remains a fragile regime that is frequently unable or unwilling to 
meet its commitments. 
• Outside actors continue to supply arms to Hutu militia in the refugee camps and 
elsewhere who seek the forceful overthrow of the RPF. This abets Tutsi 
extremists who are calling for more violent repression. 
• The UN is reluctant to commit resources to Rwanda amid severe budget 
constraints and fears of being drawn into a situation where its mandate is under-
funded and understaffed and its credibility further damaged. These feelings are 
exacerbated by the deterioration of other peacekeeping operations, notably in 
Bosnia. The recent decision by the EU and Belgium to withhold aid to the 
Rwandan government following the massacre in Kibeho are further warning 
signals of the criticism the UN could face should UNAMIR be renewed without 
associated improvements of the situation on the ground. 
• Further deep cuts in next year's UN peacekeeping budget appear inevitable. US 
contributions to peacekeeping will fall from $1.3 billion in FY 95 to substantially 
less than the $546 million the Clinton administration has requested from 
Congress for FY 96. 
• Rwanda's neighbors -- Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, and Tanzania --- all face 
domestic political pressures that complicate cooperation with UNAMIR and 
could, in various ways, subvert peace operations. 
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• A leadership vacuum exists in dealing with the Rwanda crisis, in the UN Security 
Council and more generally. This must be filled if UNAMIR and related efforts to 
promote stability in Rwanda and the region are to have a change of success. 
Only France and the UN can adequately fill this void but they must first reconcile 
their conflicting policies toward Rwanda. 
Conditions Favorable to a Renewal of UNAMIR 
• There is a government in Rwanda with which the US, France, and other 
interested countries can deal. Moderate forces willing to work for national 
reconciliation are, however, increasingly at risk. 
• Despite some set-backs, the World Bank, other bi-lateral arid multiiaterai 
development agencies, and a special War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda, still 
supportare support the avowed goals of the RPF government and are important 
elements of a 'peace infrastructure' that enhances the prospects -- as well as 
the need --for UNAMIR. 
• The large, diverse, and widely dispersed presence of international NGOs in 
Rwanda also augment and justify UNAMIR; the NGOs already have forged 
extraordinarily effective cooperation with the UN Rwandan Emergency 
Operations (UNREO) and can be strong advocates for UNAMIR. 
• None of the major powers has vital interests at stake in Central Africa, and all 
would like to avoid having to be drawn into more humanitarian emergencies. The 
recent election of a new French Government offers an important opportunity for 




With less than a month remaining in UNAM!R's mandate, the UN Security 
Council must move quickly to reach a new agreement on the mission, scale, and 
financing to continue UN peace operations in Rwanda, Indeed, UNAMIR is 
essential to any peace strategy. It should be promoted as the initial fulcrum for 
domestic and international efforts to stabilize conditions through peace and 
human rights monitoring that would, in turn, help provide security in local 
communes thereby encouraging refugees and internally displaced peopie to 
return home voluntarily. 
Joint leadership by France and the United States is a precondition for designing 11 
and implementing any UNAMIR mandate. 
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A French-American accord can be augmented by a more structured and 
engaged group of concerned states that could include Belgium, Britain, Canada, / 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, and as many of Rwanda's 
neighbors as politically practicable. 
• The RPF should be given substantial political and material support to strengthen 
the hands of the moderates. Money is needed now, along with tough messages 
regarding accountability, performance, and deadlines. 
The donor community must also exercise discipline in meeting its commitments 
in order to counter the growing resentment over the failure to meet previous 
assistance targets. 
• If a more robust and disciplined "friends of Rwanda" group were to succeed in 
helping to stabilize that country, then this same coalition could extend its role to 
promoting peace and economic cooperation across the Great Lakes Region of 
central Africa, perhaps spawning multilateral consultative groups (e.g. for arms 
control and demobilization, the environment, water management, and economic 
development) similar to those that are proving to be effective confidence building 
measures across the Middle East. 
Bearing in mind that the key to any solution lies with the dual leadership of France and 
the US, additional measures could include: 
• Curb the direction, scale, and source of weapons flows into Rwanda and the 
outlying refugee camps that are becoming increasingly visible and can and must 
be curtailed through more assertive international action. 
• Resolve the issues that have stalled the release of urgently needed World Bank 
funds that also must be part of any concerted effort to foster peace and 
reconciliation in Rwanda. 
• Prosecute those individuals responsible for genocide under Judge Goldstone's 
War Crimes Tribunal as an important element of the reassurance and 
stabilization strategy. Reports that the Tribunal is itself starved for funds -- down 
to less than $75,000 to cover operations through June-- are dismaying. 
• Counter hate radio and other forms of disinformation that threaten the 
stabilization strategy through a public education campaign involving all of the 
major international broadcasters and efforts to improve national and local media 
as agents of civic education and national reconciliation in Rwanda. 
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